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Abstract— Current online social network sites have not addressed policy control sufficiently. In addition, the existing rule-based 
proposals on policy control have not been able to cope with normative, temporal, exceptional and conflicting nature of OSNs policies. 
These characteristics of OSNs policies fit to defeasible logic formalism. Thus, we contextualized a defeasible policy language and 
proposed corresponding ontologies to extend an existing ontology framework on policy control called open digital right language. Our 
ontology proposal focused on OSNs use cases and provided solution for implementing norms, deadlines and conflict resolution and 
compensation models for policies. Deployed ontology shows that defeasible policy language is expressive enough to represent and 
manipulate complicated policy use cases of OSNs. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Privacy is the main concern in online social networks 
(OSNs) [1-5]. The issue is deepening since various OSNs are 
appearing and each contains specific personal information of 
citizens where companies and organizations are eager to 
access and benefit. Thus, the policy control framework for 
usage and access control in OSN web sites and the 
underlying applications must be addressed. Although there 
have been a lot of researches on policy control for OSNs, the 
investigation on how to express and reason with conflicting, 
exceptional, normative and temporal policies has remained 
neglected. In this paper we contextualize a defeasible policy 
language (DPL) and propose corresponding ontology 
vocabularies to represent and reason with norms, deadlines 
and conflicts in OSNs policies. 
 Access control is the dominant model for conceptualizing 
and managing privacy policy in today’s online world. 
Access control in OSNs mainly is regulated based on the 
degree of relationship, which in turn, stems from the notion 
of trust reflected in user-to-user relationship [6]. The Kruk et 
al. system, which is called D-FOAF, is the first ontology-
based and FOAF-like model for OSNs that supports access 
control based on the trust concept. This relation-based 
interpretation and implementation of access control in OSNs 
became a cornerstone for managing privacy at the very 
beginning.  
The proposal of Carminati et al. [7, 8] extended the 
previous relation-based approach by suggesting a rule-based 
model for access control based on type, depth and trust level 
of relationship in OSNs. They employed a rudimentary 
Horn-like language to regulate user’s privacy policies. 
Carminati and colleagues enhanced their access control 
architecture towards semantic web tools in [7, 9]. Their main 
idea was to represent social network information through 
ontology language and then use reasoning tools of semantic 
web to manage privacy. In fact, they followed the Kruk 
proposal [6] and extended ontologies for; (1) user’s profile, 
(2) resources (e.g., photo album), (3) actions, and finally (3) 
relationship beetween users and resources, (e.g., post a 
status). This provides the possibility of using semantic web 
reasoning tools such as SweetRules to do reasoning on 
access control. However, inference on permission can be 
complicated where the source of authorization is 
decentralized and abdicated to OSNs users. Thus, they had a 
naive discussion on conflict and exception resolution or 
express normative aspects of policies in their framework. 
Governatori and Iannella [10] argued that existing 
ontological and rule-based proposals, which are based on 
first order language, fundamentally are not capable to 
address policy language. Because normative, exceptional 
and conflicting characteristic of policies are out of the 
boundaries of first order language. Thus, they suggested to 
extend ontological framework towards defeasible logic [11] 
formalism in [12]. They suggested defeasible logic to 
overcome policy conflicts and modal operators on defeasible 
logic to address normative and temporal aspects of policies. 
They also drew outline of extending an existing ontological 
framework on policy control called Open Digital Right 
Language (ODRL). 
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This work continued the outline to cover temporalised 
policies, policy conflict detection and compensation. We 
provided ontology vocabularies to infer and compensate 
policy conflicts as well as deadlines. Then we addressed 
some usage and access control policies of OSNs using 
suggested ontologies,. We employed ODRL ontology 
version 2.1 investigated in [13] which is available in [14] 
and [15]. In the following sections we first discussed about 
DPL components. Then we described ODRL ontology 
vocabularies and finally introduced proposed ontology 
vocabularies to map DPL components to ODRL. 
II. MATERIAL AND METHOD 
In this section we contextualise DPL features based on 
Governatori and Iannella [12] proposal for policy control. 
We focus on specific OSNs policy use cases that are not 
addressed before. The use cases are brought from both 
access and usage control. Each subsection addresses one 
important gap of rule-based policy languages for OSNs. 
A. Normative policy model 
Policy languages are compliant with normative 
knowledge representation. And normative regulations can be 
represented under deontic logic [16] addresses concepts like 
obligation, permission and prohibition. These concepts 
correspond to notions such as duty, right and prohibition. 
Deontic logic extends first order logic to deontic operators O, 
P and F indicate obligation, permission and prohibition 
(forbidden) respectively. The following relations are 
satisfied with the above deontic operation, 
 
OA ≡ ¬P¬A ¬O¬A ≡ PA   O¬A ≡ FA   ¬PA≡ FA     (1) 
 
The rule OA→PA is another implication that deontic 
operations satisfy. This relation indicates that if A is 
obligatory then it is permitted. In fact, we could ensure 
internal consistency of obligations in a set of norms, by 
examining the possibility of executing obligations without 
doing forbidden acts. Governatori [17] extended standard 
deontic logic towards directed deontic operations where 
subject and beneficiary of normative operators are specified.  
Use case. “Tom forbids acquaintances to save photo”  
In detail,  denotes an obligation where s represents 
the subject and b the beneficiary of normative operator. Thus, 
 means that s (e.g., a Facebook user) has the obligation 
of A (e.g., prevent access personal information) with respect 
to b (e.g., an acquaintances). Or  means that s (e.g, an 
acquaintance) is forbidden of B (e.g, usage private data) with 
respect to b (e.g., a Facebook user). Thus, the DPL provides 
a ground for implementing normative aspect of privacy 
policies. Indeed, deontic operations denote access/deny 
permission by obligation/prohibition operations.  
B. Exception and conflict resolution model 
Conflicts in OSNs policies stem from different facets of 
social life (i.e., the source of policies might vary) [18]. 
Superiority relation in standard defeasible logic is employed 
to capture conflicts and exceptions. Exception is a state that 
implements default notion where some additional 
information prevents to trigger normal policy condition. For 
instance, the following default policy, 
Use case 1. “Facebook users are allowed to save other 
member photos, unless they are classified as private.” This 
can be represented by the following default rule, 
 
r1: photos(x) ⇒ P save(x)     (2) 
 
The rule states that if x is a photo then the save 
permission is granted. Note that there is no need to 
represents users in the rule since it is implicitly covered. But 
to represent unless part of the policy condition we have, 
 
r2: private(x) , ¬owner(x,y) ⇒ Oy¬save(x) (3) 
 
This indicates that if someone y is not owner of a photo x 
and the resource is a private then the usage of x is forbidden 
for y. Note that prohibition is expressed by obligation 
followed by negation here in this rule since prohibition is a 
negated obligation. 
Thus, two rules are contradictory and no conclusion can 
be derived. Superiority relation represents and resolves the 
conflict in the logic. Having superiority relation r1<r2, the 
rule r2 defeats r1 when both rules are triggered. 
This expressive power of defeasible logic can easily 
model conflicting policy conditions, which might come from 
different resources (OSNs or even offline life facets). The 
most privacy policies in OSNs are about specifying who can 
access which re-sources that can be classified as follows, 
• Only the resource owner 
• A friend 
• A friend list 
• The second level of friends (friends of friends) 
• All friend lists 
• Everybody 
Thus, each policy language must be able to manage usage 
(access) control for all above cases. For example, 
 
Use case 2. “Tome allowed all friend lists to save 
wedding photos except his colleagues”. Then the usage 
control in this use case can be represented as follows, 
 
r1: friend(y), wedding_photo(x)⇒ Pysave(x) (4) 
 
Expresses that if y is a friend can save wedding photo x. But 
the following rule for-bids colleagues to save the photo. 
 
r2: colleague(y) ⇒ Oy¬save(x)         (5) 
 
Similar to the last example by employing superiority relation 
(r1<r2) the exceptional case can be managed. 
C. Privacy violation resolution model 
Although contrary-to-duty (CTD) obligation is a typical 
phenomenon in normative systems, of which privacy 
policies are particular instances, it is not addressed in OSNs 
yet. On the other hand, reasoning under CTD obligations is 
one of the main philosophical aspects of deontic reasoning.  
Deontic logic of violations proposed in [19] addresses this 
particular part of deontic reasoning. A sequential order of 
CTD obligations is denoted by compensation operator ⊗ to 
be used like OA⊗OB. It means that we have the obligation 
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of A (i.e., OA), but if this is violated, i.e., we have the 
negation of A, i.e., ¬A, then the obligation OB is enforced. 
Other words, obligation B is a compensate for obligation A if 
is failed to be fulfilled. In the same way a chain of obligation 
compensation can be formulated as follows, 
 
OA1⊗…⊗OAn                                                         (6) 
 
The chain of obligation states that OA1 is the main 
obligation, but if it is violated then the next obligation 
triggers and so on. It is worth noting that only obligations 
and prohibitions can appear in the chain. Permission can 
come only at the end of the chain. Because it is not possible 
to violate permission and compensation is only meaningful 
for statements that cannot be violated.  
DPL supports the violation resolution model based on 
defeasible inference. In this language, the consequence of a 
defeasible rule can be a chain of obligation compensation. It 
is worth remembering that in standard defeasible logic, the 
consequence of a rule only can be a single literal not a chain 
of compensation. But DPL extends classical defeasible logic 
with compensation operator such that the obligation OA 
appears in conclusion. In the following defeasible rule of 
compensation obligation, to prove OA we have to prove 
negation of all elements appear before OA in the chain, 
 
P1,…,Pn ⇒ OB1⊗…⊗OBn⊗OA⊗OC1…⊗OCn          (7) 
 
All P1,...,Pn must be provable, and we must have ¬B1,..., 
¬Bn. For more details refer to [17].  
 
Use case 3. If a user is reported as abuser then he must 
remove his offensive post, or inactive his account for six 
months otherwise will not have access permission to his 
account. The obligations can be represented as follows, 
 
r1: abuser(x) ⇒ Oxremove(y) ⊗ Oxinactive(x) 
⊗ Px¬access(x).                            (8)            
 
This indicates that if x is abuser, then he must remove his 
abusive post y or otherwise inactive his account for six 
months or otherwise will lose the permission to access his 
account. Technically, if the first condition, i.e., 
Oxremove(y) is violated, the second condition must hold, 
i.e., Oxinactive(x), otherwise user will lose his access to 
his account Px¬access(x). This conclusion is contradictory 
with the general social network regulation that everyone has 
access to his account. This conflict can be resolved by using 
the exception and resolution model discussed in section B. 
D. Temporal policy model 
Time is one of the key factors in OSN policies since it is 
an important aspect of offline social life. For instance, a 
policy might be valid only for a year and compensate 
another policy for several months. Or an OSN website might 
interested to consider a deadline for an obligation in the site 
(e.g., if users are inactive for 6 months their account will be 
inactive automatically). It is essential to determine which 
policies might be in conflict in time axis. Temporalizing 
normative propositions first proposed by Governatori et al. 
in [20, 21]. They suggested RuleML like language for the 
temporal rules in [22] and [23] and showed the linear 
complexity of the logic in [24]. Then, Governatori et al. [20] 
represented the concept of deadline and enhanced it 
efficiently [12]. 
The main idea in this aspect of DPL is that each 
normative proposition is attached with a timestamp. Thus, in 
temporalizing DPL language each proposition p denotes by 
pt that t is a timestamp. For example, post(Tom, 
wedding_pic, family_list)20151013 means that Tom 
posted his wedding photo for family list on 13th of Oct 2015. 
The second key specific of DPL is that conclusions can be 
either persistent or transient. Correspondingly, two classes of 
rules (persistent or transient) are conceivable. Persistent 
rules denoted as follows, 
 
                             (9) 
 
This implies that if a1 hold on t1 and a2 hold on t2 and so 
on for all elements of the rule in antecedent, then we can 
conclude c at t, and the conclusion is valid until it is 
terminated.  
But the transient rules denoted as follows, 
 
                       (10) 
 
expresses the same semantic with the previous one except 
that the conclusion is valid only at the time t (not after that).  
This rule’s classification provides a ground to implement 
the concept of deadline in policy control. In fact, deadline is 
an obligation confined with temporal parameters in the 
context of policy languages. Deadlines also are classified 
into two distinguished types, namely, achievement 
obligation like and maintenance obligation like policies. 
Achievement obligation must happen at least once before the 
deadline (use case 4). But maintenance obligation, must hold 
during all time before deadline (use case 5). 
Use case 4. Facebook users must complete their profile 
info after 30 days of opening account. 
In this example, deadline refers to an obligation triggered 
by opening account (openinit), which is a persistent 
obligation. Then, user has to complete her profile before the 
deadline. The obligation automatically will be terminated 
only if the user obeys it (openterm). It is worth noting that 
obligation may remain persist even after the deadline (like 
this example). In this case, the role of deadline is to signal 
obligation violation (openviol). 
openinit: open_account(x)t1 ⇒pi 
Oxcomplete_profile(x)t1 
openterm: Oxcomplete_profile(x)t2, 
complete_profile(x)t2 ⇒τ 
¬Oxcomplete_profile(x)t2+1 
openviol: 
open_account(x)t1,Oxcomplete_profile(x)t1+30 ⇒τ 
viol(open)t1+30 
Having the fact set {open_account(Tom)1, 
complete_profile(Tom)20} the rule Openinit triggers the 
persistent obligation to complete profile. Then, having 
complete_profile(Tom)20 fact trigger the rule openinit 
rule which terminates obligation in 21. Thus, the violation 
rule (openviol) is not triggered on 30. 
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Use case 5. Facebook users must keep active in the last 
six month  
In this Example, the deadline signals only when 
obligation terminates. And obligation terminates only if user 
keep active (logic in the last 6 months) to the web site 
(keepterm). If obligation does not occur in some times before 
the deadline, then violation occurs (keepviol). 
keepinit: last_login(x)t1 ⇒pi Oxkeep_active(x)t1 
keepterm: Oxkeep_active(x)t1 ⇒τ 
¬Oxkeep_active(x)t1+180 
keepviol: Oxkeep_active(x)t2, 
¬Oxkeep_active(x)t2 ⇒τ viol(keep)t2 
It is worth noting that there might be cases that 
maintenance obligations are undefined (i.e., not for 180 days) 
where no termination condition needed and the rule keepterm 
will be dropped. Or might be cases that the termination 
condition exists but the exact time is not determined and 
depends on other events. For example, when termination 
condition is; if user insults other users in OSNs. In such a 
case we need to add another clause representing an event or 
action in the body of termination condition. 
Maintenance obligations do not persist after the deadline, 
while often achievement obligations do until they achieved. 
Nevertheless, there might be the cases that achievement 
obligation also terminates after deadline. For more details, 
refer to [20]. 
III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
A. ODRL Basic Components 
In the past years, ODRL has extended from a digital right 
language to a wider range of policy language. Figure 1, 
depicts the core UML model of ODRL version 2.1. 
According to the Figure, the core model components include 
policy, asset, party, permission, duty, prohibition, action and 
constraint.  
 
Fig 1. ODRL new version core model taken from ODRL community 
 
Policy is the central top entity in the ODRL model, which 
refers to Permission and Prohibition that hold the Policy. 
This entity has several subclasses, namely, agreement, offer, 
privacy, set and ticket (For more detail see [14]). In the 
domain of social network, policies focus on who is the end 
Party; only the resource owner, a friend, a friend list, the 
second level of friends (friends of a friend), all friend lists or 
everybody. 
Asset is the data object that its usage is confined by policy 
constraints. The assets in OSNs are user’s resources like 
pictures, profile info and etc. 
Party represents policy subjects that have two subtypes of 
Assigner (who establish policy constraints) and Assignee 
(who receive policy constraints). In OSNs they are users and 
their friends respectively. 
Permission allows particular Action on a specific Asset. 
Permission is related to Parties, Constraints and probable 
Duties under which license granted. For example, share a 
picture in OSNs is to give permission of display to friends. 
Prohibition is to forbid particular Action on a specific 
asset (opposite Permission). 
Duty implies necessary Action that the Permission 
Assignee has to perform to have permission applicable.  
Action is an operation that Assignee is allowed to do (if is 
about Permission), or forbidden to do (if is about Prohibition) 
or has to do (if is about Duty). Potential actions in OSNs are 
display, share, print or play of a picture (movie) and etc. 
Constraints are limitations or conditions on Permissions, 
Prohibitions or Duties in the policy language. Conditions 
may contain temporal, logical or mathematical operators.  
B. Mapping ODRL Ontology with DPL Language 
Current ODRL ontology language1 supports some basic 
elements of DPL including normative rules and conflicts 
resolution. As depicted in Figure 2, ODRL ontology 
provides a constructive model for deontic modalities 
(Permission, Prohibition and Obligation). In the following 
section we articulate rule, literals, predicates and terms, 
which are the basic vocabularies of DPL, based on ODRL 
ontology elements. Then we describe how ODRL ontology 
language can capture and implement other DPL specifics 
such as “conflict policy”, “compensation policy” and 
“temporal policy”. 
 
Fig 2. ODRL version 2.1 ontology visualized by VOWL. 
 
Rule. Rule owl:Class is placed in the central position of 
ODRL policy language ontology that implements deontic 
modalities by Permission, Prohibition and Duty disjoined 
subclasses (see Fig. 2). This class can be mapped to deontic 
operators P, ¬O and O in DPL respectively. A Rule in 
                                                 
1
 The ODRL ontology URI is available in 
http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/ 
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ODRL indicates special Action that Assignee is 
permitted/prohibited (i.e., Permission/Prohibition) to do on 
an Asset under a specific Constraint or Duty. Thus, rule 
entity is the subject of Asset (i.e., Policy), Constraint (i.e., 
time), Party (i.e., Assignee and Assigner) and Action (e.g., 
download) entities. It is worth noting that each rule must 
include exactly one Action in ODRL language. And the 
range of deontic modal properties is the union of Action and 
the modal operator. Duty (Rule owl:subclass) applied only 
as a condition of Permission/Prohibition. Consequently, each 
head literal might bound by a deontic operator (i.e., 
Permission/Prohibition/Duty), Action, Assignee and Asset 
(i.e., P Action(Assignee, Asset)). And body literals 
may include Duty, Constraint, Asset and Assigner. The rule 
RDF vocabulary in ODRL is as follows,  
 
<!--http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/Rule-->  
    <owl:Class rdf:about="Rule"> 
        <rdfs:label 
xml:lang="en">Rule</rdfs:label> 
        <rdfs:isDefinedBy rdf:resource=""/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 
<!-- http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/Permission 
-->  
    <owl:Class rdf:about="Permission"> 
        <rdfs:label 
xml:lang="en">Permission</rdfs:label> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="Rule"/> 
        <owl:disjointWith 
rdf:resource="Prohibition"/> 
        <rdfs:isDefinedBy rdf:resource=""/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 
<!-- 
http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/Prohibition -->  
    <owl:Class rdf:about="Prohibition"> 
        <rdfs:label 
xml:lang="en">Prohibition</rdfs:label> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="Rule"/> 
        <rdfs:isDefinedBy rdf:resource=""/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 
<!--http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/Duty-->  
    <owl:Class rdf:about="Duty"> 
        <rdfs:label 
xml:lang="en">Duty</rdfs:label> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="Rule"/> 
        <owl:disjointWith 
rdf:resource="Permission"/> 
        <owl:disjointWith 
rdf:resource="Prohibition"/> 
        <rdfs:isDefinedBy rdf:resource=""/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 
Policy conflict resolution. In ODRL, policy conflict 
arises when contradictory Actions appear in 
Permission/Prohibition. The instances of "Conflict term" 
owl:Class (i.e, Perm, Prohibit and Invalid) characterize the 
policies to resolve conflicts in ODRL version 2.1. Perm 
indicates that Permission is considered precedence, but 
Prohibit gives priority to Prohibition and Invalid indicates 
that the license is not applicable (this called precedent 
mechanism). Thus, the notion of conflict resolution of DPL 
language can easily be implemented by ODRL ontology 
framework. However, the “Conflict term” implementation in 
ODRL is not able to capture some notions behind superiority 
relation in DPL since its vocabulary does not support rule 
labeling. In fact, it is not going to establish superiorities 
between different policies but only consider priorities within 
a policy (risen by Prohibition/Permission). The conflict term 
vocabulary in ODRL is as follows: 
 
<!--http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/conflict-->  
<owl:ObjectProperty 
rdf:about="conflict"> 
  <rdfs:label 
xml:lang="en">conflict</rdfs:label>  
  <rdfs:range 
rdf:resource="ConflictTerm"/> 
  <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="Policy"/> 
</owl:ObjectProperty> 
 
Policy conflict deduction. One of the main challenges in 
ODRL ontology making is to create ontology vocabulary 
such that is able to detect (infer) conflicts in 
Permission/Prohibition. On the one hand, a friend (Assignee) 
might place in several friend lists where each one may 
involve in different usage (or access) policy. On the other 
hand, a resource (Asset) might be subject of different 
conflicting Policies come from different resources. Thus one 
source of conflict is Assignee and the other one is Asset. For 
example, one policy might state that all Alice close friends 
can access to all photos while another policy expresses that 
only close friends who are invited to her wedding are 
allowed to access her wedding photos. To detect conflicts in 
OSNs we suggest changing Party class in ODRL. We first 
create different friend lists as a subclass for Group (e.g., 
Friend, Colleague, Family and etc). Then we need to employ 
Individual as a class restriction for friend lists. By doing this, 
Friend is a class of instances of Individuals who participate 
in friend property (using anonymous defined class). Thus, 
each Group Policy assignment is reducible to Individual 
Policy upon which conflicting policies can be inferred and 
noticed to user. For example, Family RDF vocabulary will 
be as follows: 
 
<!-- http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/Family --> 
    <owl:Class rdf:about="Family"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="Group"/> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf> 
            <owl:Restriction> 
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="isFamily"/> 
                <owl:allValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="Individual"/> 
            </owl:Restriction> 
        </rdfs:subClassOf> 
    </owl:Class> 
 
 
This expresses that Family are individuals that has 
isFamiliy property. Thus, the result of querying use case 2 is 
as follows: 
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Individual: 
http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/Policy:02  
    Types:  
        Agreement  
    Facts:  
        prohibition  
http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/Prohibit:02, 
        conflict  Prohibition, 
        permission  
http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/Perm:02 
 
Individual: 
http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/Perm:02  
    Types:  
        Permission     
    Facts:  
        assigner  
http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/user:02, 
        action  save, 
        target  
http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/weddingPhoto:02 
 
Individual: 
http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/Prohibit:02  
    Types:  
        Prohibition     
    Facts:  
        assigner  
http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/user:02, 
        action  save, 
        target  
http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/weddingPhoto:02    
 
This policy includes two conflicting Permission and 
Prohibition policies at which Prohibition has higher priority. 
This indicates that if a friend is the subject of both policies 
then he could not save the wedding photos. 
But we should notice that in the above example Assignees 
are not determined. Indeed, Assignees are all Colleague and 
Friend instances that are determined through hasValue 
restriction as follows: 
 
<!-- http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/Friend -->  
    <owl:Class rdf:about="Friend"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="Group"/> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf> 
            <owl:Restriction> 
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="assignee"/> 
                <owl:hasValue 
rdf:resource="Perm:02"/> 
            </owl:Restriction> 
        </rdfs:subClassOf> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf> 
            <owl:Restriction> 
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="isFriend"/> 
                <owl:allValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="Individual"/> 
            </owl:Restriction> 
        </rdfs:subClassOf> 
    </owl:Class> 
 
<!-- http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/Colleague 
-->  
    <owl:Class rdf:about="Colleague"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="Group"/> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf> 
            <owl:Restriction> 
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="assignee"/> 
                <owl:hasValue 
rdf:resource="Prohibit:02"/> 
            </owl:Restriction> 
        </rdfs:subClassOf> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf> 
            <owl:Restriction> 
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="isColleague"/> 
                <owl:allValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="Individual"/> 
            </owl:Restriction> 
        </rdfs:subClassOf> 
    </owl:Class> 
 
This expresses that Friends are instances of Individual 
class who can save wedding photos whereas Colleagues 
cannot. Thus, we easily can query all individual’s policy and 
detect and notify probable conflicts in between. 
Policy compensation. As discussed in the section C, 
Duty compensation policy is denoted by compensation 
operation ⊗ in DPL. However, we can deploy 
compensation without this operator in ODRL. Because the 
rule A⇒OB⊗OC corresponds these two rules; A⇒OB, 
A,¬B⇒OC. In ODRL ontology, Duty is assumed to be 
compulsory and Duty violation is not tolerated. In detail, if 
Assignee complies Duty then he will have the Permission to 
access to the Asset otherwise cannot. We suggest extending 
ODRL model to implement precedent attribute. This 
attribute establishes connection between individuals of Duty 
class. isPrecedent property is defined irreflexive to prevent 
meaningless Duty chain. The sequence order of isPrecedent 
conveys priorities between different Duties. Policy 
compensation vocabulary is provided in the following: 
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<!-- http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/isPrecedent 
-->  
    <owl:ObjectProperty 
rdf:about="isPrecedent"> 
        <rdf:type 
rdf:resource="&owl;IrreflexiveProperty"/> 
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="Duty"/> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="Duty"/> 
      </owl:ObjectProperty>  
 
For example, ontological representation of the use case 4 
would be as follows: 
 
Individual: 
http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/Policy:04 
    Types:  
        Agreement     
    Facts:  
        permission  
http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/Perm:04 
 
Individual: 
http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/Perm:04  
    Types:  
        Permission     
    Facts:  
        assigner  Facebook, 
        action  Access, 
        target  
http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/account:04, 
        duty  
http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/requirements:04, 
        assignee  
http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/user:04 
 
Individual: 
http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/requirements:04  
    Types:  
        Duty     
    Facts:  
        isPrecedent  
http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/requirements:14, 
        action  remove 
 
Individual: 
http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/requirements:14 
    Types:  
        Duty     
    Facts:  
        action  inactive  
 
This expresses that the Duty instance 
“requirements:04” is related to the other one 
“requirements:04” trough precedent attribute where it is 
assumed that the former has higher priority but is relaxable 
by the later Duty. Thus, during applying policy we simply 
can query and check chain of Duties to implement 
compensation notion. 
Temporal Policy. ODRL ontology vocabulary supports 
temporal Constraints using dateTime, time and right 
operators by which Permission/Prohibition can determine 
deadline. Other words, Constraint (owl:class) can limit 
Permission/Prohibition policy using “dateTime”. Time 
interval also has implemented by employing right operators 
called gteq and lteq in ODRL. But the discussed deadline in 
ODRL only concerns Permission/Prohibition (e.g., “can” 
have access in deadline) not obligation or Duty (e.g., “must” 
complete the profile in deadline) whereas DPL language 
characterizes time obligations for Duties as well. In detail, 
Duty in ODRL ontology plays the role of requirement for 
Permission and duty attribute only appears in relation with 
Permission, whereas Duty in deadline is not going to 
grant/deny permission. Duty in here is to implement time 
obligation on an Action. Thus, Duty is triggered by initial 
action (init) and then obliges another action within a 
deadline (terms and conditions) otherwise obligation will be 
violated. Thus, we defined another type of Policy called 
Deadline accompanied with deadline attribute having three 
sub-properties called init, term and viol. Deadline attribute 
connect Policy to union of Duty and Action classes. Since 
every action attached with timestamp in DPL deadline use 
cases we suggest considering dateTime data property for 
Action in ODRL. We also considered “relax” data attribute 
for Duties to denote Duties that are done within the deadline. 
The suggested deadline vocabulary is as follows: 
 
<!--http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/deadline -
->  
    <owl:ObjectProperty 
rdf:about="deadline"> 
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource="Policy"/> 
        <rdfs:range> 
            <owl:Class> 
                <owl:unionOf 
rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
                    <rdf:Description 
rdf:about="Action"/> 
                    <rdf:Description 
rdf:about="Duty"/> 
                </owl:unionOf> 
            </owl:Class> 
        </rdfs:range> 
    </owl:ObjectProperty> 
 
<!-- http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/term -->  
    <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="term"> 
        <rdfs:subPropertyOf 
rdf:resource="deadline"/> 
    </owl:ObjectProperty>  
 
<!-- http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/viol -->  
    <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="viol"> 
        <rdfs:subPropertyOf 
rdf:resource="deadline"/> 
    </owl:ObjectProperty> 
 
<!-- http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/init -->  
    <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="init"> 
        <rdfs:subPropertyOf 
rdf:resource="deadline"/> 
    </owl:ObjectProperty> 
 
Thus, the use case 4 can be represented by ODRL 
ontology as follows: 
 
<http://example.com/policy:07> 
        odrl:viol  
<http://example.com/duty:27> ; 
        odrl:term  
<http://example.com/duty:17> ; 
        odrl:init  
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<http://example.com/duty:07> ; 
        rdf:type   odrl:Deadline ; 
        rdf:type   owl:NamedIndividual .  
<http://example.com/duty:07> 
        odrl:action    odrl:Open ; 
        odrl:assigner  odrl:Facebook ; 
        odrl:assignee  
<http://example.com/user:07> ; 
        odrl:action    
<http://example.com/account:07> ; 
        odrl:dateTime  "2016-04-
05"^^xsd:date ; 
        rdf:type       odrl:Duty ; 
        rdf:type       
owl:NamedIndividual .  
 
<http://example.com/duty:17> 
        odrl:action      odrl:profile ; 
        odrl:action      odrl:Complete ; 
        odrl:constraint  
<http://example.com/constraint:17> ; 
        odrl:relax       true ; 
        odrl:dateTime    "2016-04-
28"^^xsd:date ; 
        rdf:type         odrl:Duty ; 
        rdf:type         
owl:NamedIndividual .  
<http://example.com/duty:27> 
        odrl:action  odrl:Close ; 
        odrl:action  
<http://example.com/account:07> ; 
        odrl:relax   true ; 
        rdf:type     odrl:Duty ; 
        rdf:type     owl:NamedIndividual .  
 
Where policy:07 expresses that user:07 has to 
complete his profile within 30 days from opening day 
(2016-04-05). Since user has completed the profile at 
2016-04-28 the relax field of the “term” and “viol” is Duty 
set to true which indicates they are not remaining duties. 
Unlike Permission/Prohibition policies that are set up 
once, Deadline policy fields might be completed in several 
steps. For instance, system may schedule to query Deadline 
policies every day to look for Duty terms that still are not 
relaxed and their due date is reached to execute and fill viol 
Duty fields. Or when the user completes his profile “relax” 
fields in term and viol should be updated. Proposed ontology 
works for both persistent and transient types of temporal 
policies. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
In this work, we extended ODRL ontology vocabularies 
towards DPL by which addressed normative, temporal, 
exceptional and conflicting policies based on modal 
defeasible logic formalism. This empowered us to represent 
complicated policy use cases on OSNs such that able to 
address privacy concerns and policy management in a 
broader view. Policy conflict resolution and compensation 
models as well as deadlines were explored by querying use 
cases in the framework. Indeed, we can query policy 
instances using SPARQL and parse them into modal 
defeasible logic to infer and pull out implicit indications of 
provided policies. 
It is worth mentioning that an only part of policy 
implications is obtainable using ontology vocabularies and 
OWL description logic. Other aspect of reasoning with 
normative, temporal and conflicting policies is to define 
defeasible rules profile and superiority relations then apply 
them into ontological knowledge bases. This may happen 
using defeasible logic reasoning engines that support 
semantic web technology such as DR-Device and SPINdle. 
This scheme is quite feasible for heterogeneous OSNs since 
time complexity of defeasible logic is linear and it is 
employed in dealing with big data under semantic web 
technology. The suggested scheme is the subject of our 
future work. 
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